Miracle to malaise: what's next for Japan? by W. Michael Cox & Jahyeong Koo
Japan’s economy was once a world-beater. A prolonged period of
rapid growth raised the country’s per capita GDP from less than 20 percent
of the U.S. level in the early 1950s to within 20 percent by 1991. A mere two
generations after defeat in World War II, Japan had emerged as the world’s
second-largest economy and a major exporter of autos, consumer electron-
ics, semiconductors and other advanced products. Books and studies
extolled Japan as a paragon of the modern economy.
Just as it was being hailed as a dynamic model for development,
Japan’s economic miracle turned to malaise. By 2004, the country’s GDP
per capita had slipped to 71 percent of the U.S. level (Chart 1A). From
1996 to 2002, per capita GDP inched forward by just 0.2 percent. In the 131
months from February 1991 to January 2002, Japan suffered 66 months of
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recession; the United States endured
only 16. 
Stagnation also gripped Japan’s
labor market. In the 1990s, the coun-
try’s unemployment rose by nearly 3
percentage points, while the U.S. rate
fell by more than 2 percentage points.
This relative performance stood in
stark contrast to the experience from
the late 1950s through the 1980s,
when Japanese unemployment typical-
ly ran 3 to 5 percentage points below
the U.S. rate (Chart 1B).
Japan’s ills show up in the indus-
trial sector, too. From 1953 to 1991,
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Chart 1
Japan vs. United States
C. Industrial Production D. Stock Market
A. Per Capita GDP B. Unemployment Rates
SOURCES: Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development; Bureau of Economic Analysis; Cabinet Office,
Government of Japan; International Monetary Fund; Central
Intelligence Agency.1
SOURCES: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Japanese Ministry of
Health, Labor and Welfare.
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Board; Japanese Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry.
SOURCES: Dow Jones & Co.; Nihon Keizai Shimbun.
1 For GDP per capita 1950 to 1998: The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, by Angus Maddison, OECD, 2001; BEA. For GDP per
capita 1998 to 2004: BEA; Cabinet Office, Government of Japan; International Financial Statistics for population (1998–2003), IMF. For










































































average 8.5 percent a year, compared
with 3.1 percent for the U.S. Over the
next dozen years, however, growth in
U.S. factories accelerated to 3.3 per-
cent, while Japan’s industrial sector suf-
fered three recessions that left its pro-
duction index unchanged (Chart 1C).
Financial market barometers
reflect the tale of two nations. From its
peak to its trough, Japan’s Nikkei fell
by nearly three-fourths, while the Dow
Jones industrial average more than
quadrupled (Chart 1D). Real estate
values followed a similar pattern.
Prices of residential land relative to
consumption fell by nearly two-thirds
in Japan from 1991 to 2004, while
doubling in the U.S.1
Strong economies sometimes
endure rough patches, but Japan’s
long stagnation presents a conundrum.
How could a once-dynamic economy
experience such a long period of mea-
ger growth? Answering this question
may well tell us whether recent signs
of a Japanese economic revival indi-
cate that a true recovery is at last
under way. Better understanding
Japan’s experience might also provide
insights into what makes economies
succeed as well as offer policymakers
some cautionary lessons. 
Economists, of course, have ana-
lyzed Japan’s economy to discern how
it lost its way. Some have argued that
the contraction was the result of insuf-
ficient demand, prompted by a fall in
asset values as the real estate bubble
burst.2 This view, however, offers no
fundamental rationale for the climb or
fall in real estate values in the first
place, relying on naïve and misin-
formed agents as a driving force. More
important, it fails to explain why liberal
doses of government spending didn’t
reverse the country’s fortunes.
Expansionary fiscal policies in the
1990s doubled Japan’s debt relative to
GDP, with an imperceptible impact on
economic growth. Indeed, public
spending has been decreasing in
Japan for several years, yet GDP
growth has been strengthening.
Other economists contend that
the Bank of Japan’s tightening after
the fall in asset values caused the stag-
nation. This criticism—similar to one
often heard about Federal Reserve
policy in the 1930s—implies that a
precautionary loosening of monetary
policy was needed to counteract the
economic effects of plunging asset
values. Too-tight monetary policy
from late 1992 through 1996 may be
what exacerbated Japan’s recession in
the mid-1990s. It fails, however, to
account for stagnation for years after
the Bank of Japan embarked on a
strongly expansionary monetary policy
in the late 1990s.3
Neither insufficient demand nor
tight monetary policy fully explains
why a once-thriving, highly competi-
tive economy might fail to respond to
either fiscal or monetary stimulus.
Much deeper problems hindered
Japan, however, and a strong case
can be made that the culprit was
widespread impediments to economic
change.
Japan’s Structural Constraints
More than a half century ago,
economist Joseph Schumpeter wrote
that economies evolve through a
process he termed creative destruc-
tion, driven by innovation and
expanding trade. Schumpeter’s
famous phrase captured the essence
of capitalism: continuous change—out
with the old, in with the new. When
competing for customers, producers
adopt new technologies, improve pro-
duction methods, expand markets and
introduce new and better products.
All these activities roil the status quo,
making some companies and workers
obsolete while providing opportuni-
ties for others. Policies that discour-
age innovation and stifle competition
prevent economies from replenishing
themselves. In time, they weaken and
recede, a consequence only hastened
by connection to the global market-
place. 
For most of its modern history,
Japan resisted creative destruction by
trying to tamp down capitalism’s cre-
ation and carnage. As seen in Chart 2,
for example, the country’s business
closure and start-up rates are a third
to a half the United States’, with the
Chart 2
Business Closure and Start-up Rates in U.S. and Japan
SOURCE: “Sectoral Productivity and Economic Growth in Japan, 1970–98: An Empirical Analysis Based on the JIP
Database,” by Kyoji Fukao, Tomohiko Inui, Hiroki Kawai and Tsutomu Miyagawa, Economic and Social Research
Institute, Discussion Paper Series, No. 67, October 2003.
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PercentWhen it needed to be
more dynamic, Japan
found its economy too
high cost to compete with
the Chinese and too 
inflexible to keep pace
with the nimble
Americans.
least change coming in Japan’s show-
case sector—manufacturing.
Many of the explanations for
Japan’s malaise focus on structural
issues, recognizing Schumpeter in spir-
it, if not by name. There is, for exam-
ple, the “zombie hypothesis” that
Japanese banks concealed bad credit
issued to large money-losing firms,
keeping them alive by discounting
interest rates and constantly renewing
loans. Throwing good money after
bad led to a scarcity of investment
funds for more productive enterprises,
and the overall economy’s productivity
and growth rates sagged. 
These views are on the right
track. They recognize structural reform
in the financial, industrial and govern-
ment sectors as necessary for recov-
ery. Their fault lies in being incom-
plete. A Schumpeterian approach
offers the necessary breadth and
depth for a proper diagnosis of
Japan’s ills. 
Canada’s Fraser Institute compiles
broad data on nations’ policies in
terms of the freedom to compete and
choose, with secure property rights
and voluntary exchange. On a scale of
zero to 10—worst to best—the Fraser
index measures economic freedom in
five major areas: size of government,
legal structure and security of property
rights, access to sound money, free-
dom to exchange with foreigners, and
regulation of credit, labor and busi-
ness. Data for 1995, the approximate
midpoint of Japan’s malaise, show the
country with a mediocre score of 5 or
below in seven specific areas—all
indicative of policies impeding the
economy’s ability to revitalize itself.
The United States, a country that
showed a lot of economic zip in the
1990s, had significantly higher scores
in each of these measures (Chart 3). 
Let’s examine some specifics:
• Taxes were onerous. Japan’s
top marginal income tax rate kicked in
at a very low income level compared
with other nations. High taxes don’t
just discourage hard work, they also
lower the return for risk taking and
discourage innovation and entrepre-
neurship—the cornerstones of prog-
ress. High payroll taxes reduce work-
ers’ incentive to keep up with new
technologies and enhance their skills.
• Japan maintained a large num-
ber of hidden barriers to imports.
Numerous Lilliputian rules and regula-
tions impose unnecessary restrictions
on packaging, licensing, labeling,
quality control, technical standards
and so on. In stifling foreign competi-
tion, they allow domestic inefficiencies
to linger.
• Irregular payments to govern-
ment officials were another worrisome
sign. Favoritism in regulatory deci-
sions, subsidies to special interests,
cronyism in hiring and firing—all such
activities contribute to the nexus of
politics and business that supports
existing economic interests and makes
it harder on newcomers. 
• Japan erected hurdles to start-
ing new businesses and discouraged
price competition. Barriers to entry are
a well-recognized and effective means
to keep new competition at bay and
Chart 3
Economic Freedom in the U.S. and Japan, 1995
(Fraser Index Scores)
SOURCE: Economic Freedom of the World: 2005 Annual Report, by James Gwartney and Robert Lawson, Vancouver:
The Fraser Institute, 2005.
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ers. Price controls inhibit the signaling
mechanism that restructures the econ-
omy away from declining sectors
toward growing ones, from inefficient
businesses toward well-managed ones. 
• Japan’s banking system con-
tributed to the inflexibility. More than
40 percent of companies’ shares are
held by bank-related institutions, and
members of the keiretsu (business
family) own 20 to 30 percent of the
shares of their group’s bank. As a
result, banks lend mainly to
entrenched companies with which
they have a relationship rather than
funding up-and-coming ventures.
Institutions are overly concerned with
collateral, and credit is allocated on
the basis of export performance. This
is not a financial system favorable to
new or small companies.
These economic rigidities and
others robbed Japan’s economy of its
ability to adapt by replacing old firms
and jobs with new ones. Few of the
impositions, of course, were new in
the 1990s. Indeed, the policies that
eventually slowed Japan were put in
place during the years it prospered—
many of them cited as key factors in
the country’s economic success. Why
have they become problems in the
past 15 years?
Japan’s experience illustrates what
makes economic meddling so tempt-
ing: Often, restrictive policies seem to
work for a time, only to become a
drag on the economy after they’ve
been in place long enough to bind.
With output and productivity so far
behind the levels of world leaders,
Japan could focus on developing spe-
cific industries, importing technologies
and reaping economies of scale. These
advantages played out, however, as
Japan reached economic maturity and
needed an environment designed
more to lead than to follow. Japan
then faced the whole new challenge
of repositioning its economy, welcom-
ing emerging industries and creating a
new generation of jobs. When it need-
ed to be more dynamic, Japan found
its economy too high cost to compete
with the Chinese and too inflexible to
keep pace with the nimble Americans.
Steps Toward Economic Reform
Crisis often provides a catalyst for
change. The Japanese, having seen
their once-vaunted economic system
struggle for a decade, have begun to
accept the need for fundamental
reform. Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi led his party to electoral vic-
tory in October by advocating what at
one time was unthinkable: privatiza-
tion of the postal savings system that
has invested in questionable public
works projects. By keeping a big
chunk of Japan’s household wealth
out of banks, postal savings stunted
the growth of other, more effective
financial institutions. The privatization
won’t be completed until 2017, but
first-stage reforms already allow
Japanese savers to buy mutual funds
at post office windows. 
Other areas also reflect Japan’s
increased willingness to reduce its
economic system’s rigidities. The latest
scores from the Fraser Institute’s sur-
vey show that Japan improved
between 1995 and 2003 in four key
areas—taxes, hidden import barriers,
irregular payments to government offi-
cials and ease of starting a business
(Chart 4). Scores remain the same in
two areas—price controls and private
ownership of banks. Not all signs are
positive: The Fraser barometer on flex-
ibility in hiring and firing fell from 4.8
in 1995 to 3.7 in 2003, indicating new
impositions on firms’ ability to adjust
their labor forces.
Job creation and destruction are
normal—indeed, integral—parts of
economic revitalization. Schumpeter
recognized as much when he coined
the term technological unemployment
to echo creative destruction. Most
unemployment is technological in
nature, the result of new and better
products or production methods. Just
as important, most unemployment is
temporary. Displaced workers find
new jobs in expanding firms and
industries. For the economy as a
whole, flexibility in hiring and firing is
Chart 4
Economic Freedom in Japan, 1995 vs. 2003
(Fraser Index Scores)
SOURCE: Economic Freedom of the World: 2005 Annual Report, by James Gwartney and Robert Lawson, Vancouver:
The Fraser Institute, 2005.
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valuable to more valuable uses.
Protecting workers from competition
and change can be just as damaging
to an economy as protecting firms. 
In a capitalist system, there
should be no equating unemployment
with failure, dishonor and shame. Yet,
there are signs that just such an inter-
pretation too often holds in Japan and
presents an impediment to labor-mar-
ket reform (see box titled “Suicide and
Unemployment in Japan”).
Although the Fraser data cast
doubt on Japan’s willingness to
change its attitudes and practices on
job losses, some encouraging signs
have begun to appear. Over the past
few years, Japan has seen a marked
increase in the practice of employing
part-time and contract workers in lieu
of traditional “lifetime” workers. In
effect, firms are bypassing the tradi-
tional system, with all its rigidities, by
filling a greater portion of their work-
forces via less regulated channels.
They get flexibility without having to
wait for major reform. Canon, the
giant electronics firm, now uses non-
regular workers for 70 percent of its
factory work, compared with 50 per-
cent five years ago and 10 percent a
decade ago.
Canon isn’t alone. Overall, nearly
a third of Japan’s labor force is com-
posed of contract or part-time work-
ers, up from 20 percent just a decade
ago. The increase in part-time and
temporary workers is most prevalent
among the young, but in every age
cohort the proportion has increased
(Chart 5).
This trend is a hopeful sign for
two reasons. First, it brings the labor
market flexibility sorely needed for
economic evolution. Second, it reflects
an acceptance of the notion that jobs
are not permanent. 
In Schumpeter’s constantly churn-
ing vision of capitalism, opening new
markets is a key factor driving creative
destruction. So trade and cross-border
investment can play an important role
in fomenting economic change. For
Japan, as well as other countries, the
rapid rise of China presents challenge
and opportunity. Trade between the
two countries has nearly doubled over
the past four years. Japan imports
mostly Chinese consumer goods, many
made by subsidiaries of Japanese com-
panies. China relies on Japan for capi-
tal goods—in particular, electrical, gen-
eral and precision machinery, all rela-
tively high-tech inputs into China’s
production process (Chart 6). 
Suicide and Unemployment in Japan
Restrictive labor practices often reflect a society’s fear of the disruptions
caused by job losses. Do Japan’s fears go even deeper? An unusual link between
male suicide rates and unemployment suggests that Japan exhibits a cultural
psychology that makes job losses a particularly heavy burden. 
From 1953 to 2003, each 1 percentage point increase in the cyclical com-
ponent of the male unemployment rate led to a 5.39 percentage point increase in
the cyclical component of the male suicide rate. This effect is 38 times larger for
Japan than for the United States. The link holds for women in Japan, although it
is much weaker, at 1.38 percentage point. There is no significant relationship
between female suicide and unemployment rates in the United States. 
The strong link between unemployment and suicide probably reflects two
aspects of Japanese society. First, the Japanese are more likely to interpret los-
ing a job as a personal failure, rather than the normal working of the economic
system. Second, they may be more pessimistic about finding new employment
in an economy that doesn’t feature robust job creation.
SOURCE: Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare.
Adaptability is the key
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foreign direct investment in China.
Such prominent Japanese companies
as Toyota, Toshiba, Hitachi, Sony and
Honda have spent billions of dollars to
set up low-cost production facilities in
China—in effect, finding a cheap-labor
alternative to their own rigid labor
market (Chart 7). The combination of
Japanese technology and Chinese labor
is not only helping keep Japan Inc.
competitive but also forcing changes at
home as companies revamp their oper-
ations for global efficiency.
Real Recovery, or Another False Dawn?
A number of upbeat statistics and
reports on Japan’s economy have
begun to appear, suggesting the coun-
try may finally be getting through its
soft patch. GDP rose 2.9 percent in
the most recent four quarters, adding
to a 2.4 percent gain the previous 12
months. In the past two years, the
unemployment rate fell to 4.5 percent
from 5.1 percent. Industrial produc-
tion has been rising, although not at
the pace of the miracle days. And the
Nikkei increased 40 percent in 2005. 
Chart 5
Part-Time and Contract Workers in Japan
SOURCE: Statistical Handbook of Japan 2005, Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications,
Statistics Bureau and Statistical Training and Research Institute, Chapter 12, “Labor”; unpublished data.
Chart 6
Japan’s Exports to China, 2003
SOURCE: Japanese Ministry of Finance.
The combination of
Japanese technology and
Chinese labor is helping

































7 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS EconomicLetterHas a real recovery at long last
begun? There is no guarantee. The
country’s economic measures have
turned upward before, only to lose
steam. As encouraging as the recent
performance has been, Japan’s eco-
nomic revival will require further
progress in sweeping away impedi-
ments to innovation, productivity and
growth. Japan has shown a new will-
ingness to reform, but the job is far
from finished. Like Germany and
other nations, Japan needs to embrace
creative destruction, not avoid it. 
Adaptability is the key to success
in a globalizing world economy.
When business and labor use govern-
ment to reject change, protect firms
and shield workers, the economy will
eventually become less competitive
and less productive. The best long-run
policy involves avoiding protectionism
and letting the economy evolve—so it
can stay competitive and vibrant.
Because labor is an economy’s most
valuable resource, it is particularly
important that Japan’s workers see
opportunity, not loss, in the nation’s
transition from lifetime employment to
upward mobility.
Chart 7
Japan’s Foreign Direct Investment in Asia
SOURCE: Japanese Ministry of Finance.
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